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     The impact of conservative accounting in residual income valuation (RIV) and abnormal 
earnings growth (AEG) valuation modeling is investigated in this paper. Unconstrained and 
two types of constrained model specifications are evaluated regarding their ability to 
withstand biases in book values and earnings due to accounting conservatism. Given that the 
“clean surplus relation” holds and that the precision of forecasted accounting numbers is 
unaffected by the type of accounting principles, the unconstrained valuation models are – not 
surprisingly – found to be immune to conservatism. This does not hold for the constrained 
models, even though conservatism can be accommodated in these if the time-series 
specification of the conservative bias fulfils certain conditions.  In a comparison between 
terminal value constrained models, the AEG model is found to be superior to the RIV model 
if the growth of the conservative bias in the terminal period is not too extreme. Comparing the 
information dynamics constrained models being proposed in Ohlson (1995) and Ohlson & 
Juettner-Nauroth (2005), the AEG model is potentially more accurate than the RIV model. 
However, in a company steady state setting with constant growth, there is no comparative 
advantage for the AEG model. Also, using the same set of forecasted accounting numbers in 
the information dynamics constrained RIV model as in the corresponding AEG model, the 
two models cannot be ranked. 
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1. Introduction and Summary 
 
  Contemporary research as well as teaching in accounting-based valuation has clearly been 
influenced by the valuation models that were proposed in Ohlson (1995), Feltham & Ohlson 
(1995), and Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005). In the first two articles a “residual income 
valuation” (RIV) framework was launched, specifying a certain linkage between earnings and 
book values of owners´ equity, and the value of owners´ equity. In the third article, another 
valuation approach – labelled “abnormal earnings growth” (AEG) valuation – was specified, 
promoting the idea that earnings and earnings growth rather should have a first-order 
importance in accounting-based valuation. A number of advantages of AEG valuation were 
pointed out in Ohlson (2005) and Ohlson & Gao (2006). As one of these advantages, AEG 
valuation was claimed to be less sensitive to measurement biases caused by conservative 
accounting. 
  In this paper valuation errors caused by conservative accounting in RIV and AEG 
valuation modeling are further analysed and compared. Two main questions will be 
addressed: 
•  To what extent can RIV and AEG valuation models accommodate conservatively 
biased accounting numbers? Will conservative accounting always cause errors in 
model-based equity values – or can the valuation models be immune to such 
measurement biases? 
•  Which type of modeling – RIV versus AEG valuation – is the least affected by 
accounting conservatism? Or, more specifically, if an investor is unable to make an 
assessment of the conservative bias in some accounting regime – which type of 
modeling is to be preferred?  
  Measurement biases of earnings and book values are specified as in Skogsvik (1998) and 
Zhang (2000), and both unconstrained and parsimonious model specifications are evaluated in 
the paper. The parsimonious models are constrained in the sense that either terminal values 
are presumed to be zero, or a constant growth factor is used to forecast residual income or 
abnormal earnings growth over infinite time horizons.  
  Throughout the paper it is assumed that the “clean surplus relation” holds in both unbiased 
and conservative accounting, and that company taxes are unaffected by the choice of 
accounting principles. In order to isolate valuation errors caused by conservative accounting, 
it is presumed that the valuation models would be without error if the accounting was 
     3unbiased. Differences between RIV or AEG equity values with conservative accounting and 
the corresponding values with unbiased accounting, will hence only be due to accounting 
conservatism. 
  The main results of the paper are as follows: 
•  Unconstrained RIV and AEG valuation models are unaffected by conservative 
accounting. Given that the precision of forecasted accounting numbers is unaffected 
by conservatism, this result is well-known (cf. Penman, 2006, pp. 593-603). 
•  Terminal value constrained RIV and AEG valuation models are in general affected by 
conservative accounting. The valuation error of the RIV model is non-positive and 
depends on the magnitude of the conservative bias of owners´ equity at the terminal 
point in time. The error of the AEG model depends on the capitalized growth of the 
conservative bias in the terminal period. The valuation error of the AEG model is 
smaller than the error of the RIV model if the growth in the terminal period is 
sufficiently small. If the terminal period coincides with the first year in a company 
“steady state” with non-negative growth, the AEG model is less affected by 
accounting conservatism. 
•  The information dynamics constrained RIV and AEG models – the core models in 
Ohlson (1995) and Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005) – are in general affected by 
accounting conservatism. However, the AEG model is able to accommodate a less 
restrictive time-series dynamics of the conservative bias, even though the empirical 
relevance of this advantage is somewhat moot. In a “steady state” setting, the 
information dynamics constrained RIV and AEG models are both unaffected by 
accounting conservatism. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. More general assumptions and model 
specifications are provided in section 2. In section 3, the characterization of accounting 
conservatism is outlined. The RIV models are evaluated in section 4 – in 4.1 the 
unconstrained model and in subsections 4.2 and 4.3 the terminal value and the information 
dynamics constrained specifications, respectively. Similarly, evaluations of the AEG models 
are presented in section 5 − the unconstrained model in subsection 5.1 and the constrained 
model specifications in 5.2 and 5.3. Conditions for the AEG models to be less affected by 
conservative accounting than the corresponding RIV models are provided in section 6. 
Concluding remarks follow in the last section. 
 
 
     4 
2. Assumptions and Valuation Models 
 
      Two types of accounting-based valuation modeling are considered in the paper – one 
based on the profitability concept “residual income” labelled “residual income valuation” 
(RIV),
1 and the other based on “abnormal earnings growth”, labelled “abnormal earnings 
growth (AEG) valuation”.
2 Both types of modeling are consistent with the generic valuation 
approach commonly labelled “present value of expected dividends” (PVED). The following 
assumptions are henceforth presumed to hold throughout the paper: 
(G-1)  In both unbiased and conservative accounting, deviations from the “clean surplus 
relation” (i.e. that net income, dividends and/or new issues of equity capital account 
for all changes in the book value of owners´ equity) in future financial statements are 
expected to be zero. 
(G-2)  Market values are used in the accounting for dividends and new issues of equity 
capital in the financial statements. Dividends and/or new issues of owners´ equity are 
settled at the end of future reporting periods. 
(G-3)  The investment risk associated with future (net) dividend payments is incorporated in 
the required (expected) return on owners´ equity.  
(G-4)  The required (expected) return on owners´ equity is non-stochastic and has a flat term 
structure. 
  In order to simplify the notation, the valuation point in time occurs at t = 0 (immediately 
after any dividend and/or new issue of equity capital at the end of the previous period, have 
been settled). The following notation will be used:  
     Pt   =  value of owners´ equity based on PVED at time t, after capital transactions 
(dividend and/or new issue of equity capital) between the company and the 
owners at time t       
    
...
0 V 
                                                
 =   value of owners´ equity according to model … at time t = 0, after capital  
 transactions between the company and the owners at time t = 0 
    Bvt   =    book value of owners´ equity at time t, after capital transactions between 
  the company and the owners at time t 
    Divt   = dividend payment minus new issue of equity capital at time t 
     Xt   =  accounting earnings (= net income) accrued in period t 
 
1 Cf. Peasnell (1982), Ohlson (1995) and Feltham & Ohlson (1995), or earlier references such as Preinreich 
(1938) and Edwards & Bell (1961). 
2 AEG valuation is due to Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005). 
     5     r   ≡
t , res ≡ 1 t Bv −
0 E
  R – 1   =   required (expected) rate of return on owners´ equity 
     X   Xt  – r ⋅   =   residual income, accrued in period t 
( … )    =     expectation operator, conditioned on the available information at time 
t = 0 
 
  Given the assumptions (G-2), (G-3) and (G-4), the value of owners´ equity according to 
PVED is: 
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  Inserting a horizon point in time t = T, PVED can equivalently be written as: 
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  The “clean surplus relation” as specified in (G-1) implies: 
       
      ()( ) ( ) ( ) 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 Div E X E Bv E Bv E + τ + τ τ + τ − + =           (CSR) 
  
      Rewriting (CSR) so  becomes the dependent variable and incorporating this into 
(PVED), the unconstrained RIV model – denoted RIV
* − easily unfolds: 
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      Given (G-1) to (G-4), obviously  ( ) * RIV
0 V =  P 0 according to PVED. 
  The unconstrained AEG valuation model – denoted  ( ) * AEG
0 V  − can be derived through the 
following rewriting of (PVED): 
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  Similar to the structure of RIV
*, the unconstrained AEG model consists of: 
●   The capitalized value of (expected) earnings in the first period ( ).  () r / X E 1 0
●   The present value of capitalized (expected) abnormal earnings growth over the periods  




τ τ + τ ⋅ − ⋅ +
1 T
1
1 0 R / r / R X Div r X E)
      ●   The present value of the (expected) difference between the value of owners´ equity  
           and the capitalized value of earnings at the horizon point in time  
           ( ).  ()
T
T T T 0 R / r / R X Div P E ⋅ − +
 
  The unconstrained AEG
* model was neither specified in Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005) nor Ohlson (2005), even though valuation errors due to the omission of a terminal 
value were evaluated in the latter article. However, allowing  ∞ → T , invoking a constant 
relative growth less than r for  ) R X Div r X ( t t 1 t ⋅ − ⋅ + +
) 0
, and consequently presuming that 
 as  ( r / R X Div P E T T T 0 → ⋅ − + ∞ → T , the information dynamics constrained model in 
Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005) is easily obtained from (AEG
*). 
 As  AEG
* is derived as a simple rewriting of (1),  ( ) * AEG
0 V  is equivalent to (PVED). Note 
that assumption (G-1) (the “clean surplus relation”) is not necessary for this result to hold. 
However, (G-1) will not cause any harm to the AEG valuation model, but rather put some 
discipline on the permissible accounting principles for the analyses to be carried out. Also, 
(G-1) will ensure that measures of abnormal earnings growth will unambiguously be linked to 
measures of residual income, i.e.: 
 
         =    () R X Div r X E t t 1 t 0 ⋅ − ⋅ + + ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 t t t 1 t 0 Bv r X Bv r X E − + ⋅ − − ⋅ −    =     
      =   ( ) [ ] 1 t , res 0 X E + Δ                                                                                         (2) 
  
     7  Expression (2) implies that abnormal earnings growth in period t+1 is equal to the 
difference between residual income in period t+1 and period t. 
  An additional assumption to be used in the analyses of the unconstrained and terminal 
value constrained models, is concerned with the available information to capital investors. It 
is in this regard presumed that investors are informed about the ability of companies to pursue 
business activities with non-zero net present values (NPV), in the sense that: 
 
(G-5)  Capital investors expect that companies at some (firm specific) point in time t = T
* ≥ 0 




 Given  unbiased accounting and setting T ≥ T
*, the terminal residual value in the 
unconstrained RIV model drops out. This follows since  ( ) ( ) * T 0 * T 0 P E Bv E =  when the 
accounting is unbiased (cf. the specification of conservative accounting in section 3 below). In 
AEG
*, a similar result requires that the horizon point in time is set to T ≥ (T
* + 1), as unbiased 
accounting and the “clean surplus relation” imply that:
 
 
   () ( ) r / R X Div P E
u




1 T 0 − −  (3) 
       where:     = (denotes) unbiased accounting  
) u ( ...
 
Assumption (G-5) allows for the following observation: 
 
Observation 1: Given the “clean surplus relation” (G-1), only 0-NPV activities after t = T
* 
(G-5) and an unbiased accounting regime, the expected terminal residual 
value in RIV
* is zero if T ≥ T
*. In AEG
*, the expected terminal residual value 
is zero if T  ≥ (T
* + 1). 
 
      Observation 1 deviates slightly from “Proposition I” in Ohlson (2005). This depends on 
the truncation error in the AEG model being specified as  ( ) r / X P E 1 T T 0 + −  at t = T by  
Ohlson,
 3 while the truncation error in the unconstrained AEG model is 
( ) r / R X Div P E T T T 0 ⋅ − + . Assumption (G-5) implies that  ( ) T 0 X E  ≠  ( )
) u (
1 T 0 Bv r E − ⋅
T T + ≥
∗
 for 
, and hence that the truncation error in AEG
* cannot be zero unless  .  
∗ ≤ T T 1
 
                                                 
3 Cf. Ohlson (2005), p. 333. Ohlson´s proposition is insidious in claiming that the truncation error at time t = T 
includes an assessment of  XT+1; ie. earnings for the first  period after the terminal point in time. Also, the 
definition of the truncation error in Ohlson (2005) is inconsistent with the specification of the unconstrained  
AEG model. 
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3. Modeling Accounting Conservatism 
 
      Accounting conservatism means that the accounting principles being used in the financial 
statements are prudent, in the sense that: 
●   Acquisition costs of operating assets are written down or depreciated more quickly 
   than what would be required according to fair cost matching principles (cf. Skogsvik,  
   1998). 
      ●   Operating assets and liabilities are impaired/appreciated in compliance with the  
        principle of  “lower of historical cost or market” and “higher of contractual obligation or  
        market”, respectively. 
      ●   Holding gains and unrealized profits in inventory and work-in-progress are not  
        recognized in the financial statements, while unrealized losses are recognized when  
        they occur or can be foreseen. 
      ●   Positive net present values of neither current nor future business projects are  
        recognized in the financial statements. 
 
  The first and the fourth point refer to what commonly is labelled unconditional (“ex ante”) 
conservatism, while the second and third point refer to conditional (“ex post”) conservatism 
(cf. Ryan, 2006). Reasonably, in accounting-based valuation modeling the importance of 
conditional conservatism will be subordinated to the importance of unconditional 
conservatism, as future expected values of the former type of conservatism in general should 
be close to zero.  
  Assuming that the “clean surplus relation” holds, a simple and non-ambiguous definition 
of conservative accounting can focus on the measurement bias of the book value of owners´ 
equity (i.e. financial plus operating assets, minus financial and operating liabilities). 
 
   ● Definition of Conservative Accounting: 
  “Conservative accounting” denotes a set of accounting principles being characterized  
       as follows: 
 0                                                  (4.a)  Cb Bv Bv 0 0
) u (
0 ≥ = −
 
( ) () () 0 Cb E Bv E Bv E t 0 t 0
) u (
t 0 ≥ = − ... , 2 , 1 t  ,    for   = ,T ;  ∞ → T            (4.b) 
              
[   ( ) () ] ( ) [ ( )] t 0
) u (
t 0 1 t t
) u (
t 0 t 0 Cb E X E Cb Cb X E X E Δ − = − − = −            (5) 
     9  Conservative accounting hence means that book values of owners´ equity are expected to 
be negatively biased. Obviously, this specification of conservative accounting hinges on the 
existence of unbiased accounting principles, where  ( ) ( ) t 0
) u (
t 0 P E Bv E =  for   (cf. Zhang, 
2000). Also note that the bias of future earnings depends on the growth of the conservative 
bias in future periods (
* T t ≥
) Cb ( t Δ ). Only when the growth of the conservative bias is positive, 
will earnings be negatively biased; in particular, if  0 ) Cb ( t = Δ  earnings wil be unaffected by 
accounting conservatism. 
  
4. Conservative Accounting in RIV Modeling 
 
  The impact of conservative accounting in three RIV model specifications will be 
investigated in this section. The first one is the unconstrained RIV model (subsection 4.1), the 
second one is a terminal value constrained model (subsection 4.2) and the third one is an 
information dynamics constrained model (subsection 4.3). In the first constrained model, the 
terminal residual value in RIV
* is postulated to be 0. The information dynamics constrained 
model implies that future residual income is expected to grow at a constant rate, and that the 
horizon point in time . The specification coincides with the benchmark model in 
Ohlson (1995) (formula (5)) when the exogenous variable “other information” is set to zero in 
the time-series of future expected residual income. 
∞ → T
  Valuation errors will be assessed as the difference between values of owners´ equity in a 
setting with conservative accounting and the corresponding values in a setting with unbiased 
accounting. The latter values are viewed as the correct equity values, and any deviations will 
solely be due to accounting conservatism. Notably, an evaluation of this type does not allow 
for any “undoing” of conservative biases in forecasted accounting numbers. Assessed 
valuation errors are thus representative for modeling applications being done as if the 
available accounting information was unbiased. 
 
4.1. The unconstrained RIV model    
      Given unbiased accounting, the value of owners´ equity in the unconstrained RIV model − 
  − is: 
∗ RIV
UB , 0 V
            +  
∗ RIV
UB , 0 V = () u
0 Bv
() ( ) ( ) ∑
= τ
τ








Bv r X E
    +    
( ) ( )
* T
u
* T * T 0
R
Bv P E −
    =   
     =       +   () u
0 Bv
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= τ
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Bv r X E
                          (6) 
     10  With conservative accounting, book values of owners´ equity and earnings will be biased 
in accordance with expressions (4.a), (4.b) and (5) above, and as 
( ) () * T * T 0
) u (
* T 0 * T 0 Cb Bv E Bv E ) P ( E + = =  we get: 
          
                +   
∗ RIV
CB , 0 V  = 0 Bv () ∑
= τ
τ
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             (7) 
 
The valuation error of the unconstrained RIV model – denoted   − is calculated as the 
difference between (7) and (6): 
RIV
0 Dev
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Cb r Cb E





      (8) 
 
  Since the “clean surplus relation” is presumed to hold in both unbiased and conservative 
accounting, it is easily shown that ( ) 0 Dev
* RIV
0 = .
4 Hence we have the following observation, 
elaborated first in Preinreich (1938) but often “rediscovered” in later research (cf., for 
example, Ohlson, 1995, p. 667): 
 
Observation 2: Given the “clean surplus relation” (G-1), the unconstrained RIV
 model (RIV
*) 
is unaffected by accounting conservatism. 
 
  The above result is hardly surprising – as long as accounting conservatism does not 
violate the “clean surplus relation”, the creation and/or realization of measurement biases will 
always be valuation neutral in unconstrained RIV modeling. 
 
4.2. The terminal value constrained RIV model 
  The terminal value constrained RIV model – denoted RIV(TVC) – differs from RIV
* in 
the sense that the terminal value  ( T T 0 Bv P E ) −  is postulated to be zero. Given unbiased 
accounting, the rationale for a model specification of this kind is obvious – if T = T
* and the 
                                                 
4 Proof in Appendix. 
     11company steady state starts in period T
*+1, the expected terminal value in RIV
* is zero 
(Observation 1, section 2). However, the question is now concerned with the valuation error 
of RIV(TVC) when T = T
* and the accounting is conservatively biased. 
  The valuation error of RIV(TVC) is calculated as the difference between   and 
) , where: 
( TVC RIV
CB , 0 V )
( TVC RIV
UB , 0 V
     )   =    ( TVC RIV
UB , 0 V ( ) u
0 Bv   +  
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  Knowing that     +   0 Cb − ( ) [] ∑
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  =  0   
  (cf. (8) and Observation 2 in the previous subsection), the valuation error of RIV(TVC) is: 
 
    =     () ) TVC ( RIV
UB , 0
) TVC ( RIV
CB , 0
TVC RIV
0 V V Dev − =
                          =  +   0 Cb − ( ) [] ∑
= τ
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Cb r Cb E





−  (11) 
 
  (11) shows that the valuation error of the terminal value constrained RIV model
 is a 
function of the conservative bias of owners´ equity at the terminal point in time. As 
conservative accounting implies that ( ) 0 Cb E
T 0 ≥ ∗ , the valuation error of    is non-
positive. The result allows for the following proposition: 
) TVC ( RIV
0 V
 
Proposition 1: Given the “clean surplus relation” (G-1), only 0-NPV activities after 
                         t = T
* (G-5), RIV(TVC) with T = T
* accommodates conservative accounting if  
                        (and only if)  () 0 Cb E * T 0 = , or equivalently if  .  []0
* T
1
0 Cb ) Cb ( E − = Δ ∑
= τ
τ
  Proposition 1 implies that   is unaffected by accounting conservatism if the 
conservative bias at the valuation point in time together with 
) TVC ( RIV
CB , 0 V
( ) t Cb Δ  for all periods up to 
     12 t = T, are such that  . The negative valuation impact due to   
being smaller than   will then exactly be compensated by the positive bias of residual 
income in future periods. 
() () ∑
= τ
τ = Δ +
* T
1





4.3. The information dynamics constrained RIV model 
      In the “information dynamics constrained” RIV model specification (denoted RIV(IDC)), 
residual income is expected to grow at a constant periodic rate (less than r) and the horizon 
point in time  . With unbiased accounting, the information dynamics constrained 
model is hence: 
∞ → T
 
      )   =    ( IDC RIV
UB , 0 V ( ) u
0 Bv  +  








1 0       (12)  
 
       where:  γ  =  1 + relative growth of expected unbiased residual income in periods  
                                t = 1, 2, …,T;  ∞ → T  
 
  The time series specification of future (expected) unbiased residual income is: 
 
  () () ( )
u u
1 0 Bv r X E τ + τ ⋅ −    =    () ( )
u
1 , res 0 X E + τ    =    ( ) ( )
u
, res 0 X E τ ⋅ γ    (13) 
 
 Given  unbiased accounting and knowing that the company eventually will pursue only  
0-NPV projects, assumption (G-5) is now replaced with (G-5´):
 5 
 
(G-5´) The parameter γ incorporates that the company over time increasingly will engage in  
           0-NPV projects, and in the long run only pursue 0-NPV activities; hence 0 ≤ γ < 1,0.
 6 
 
  In accordance with (G-5´), investors realize that future expected values of residual income 
given unbiased accounting will go towards zero in the long run. This is a reasonable 
assumption given that competitive market conditions prevail in company input-/output 
markets, implying that companies in the long run are expected to pursue only 0-NPV 
activities. 
                                                 
5An exact mapping between T
* in assumption (G-5) and  γ  in (G-5´) is hard to pinpoint, even though T
* and γ in 
principle should be positively related. That is, if  ( ) ( ) 0 Bv r X E 0
u
1 0 ≠ ⋅ −  and T
* is close in time, γ will have a low 
value, and vice versa. 




t 0 Bv r X E − ⋅ − , γ  is assumed to be non-negative. 
     13  Presuming that investors leave γ unchanged in a valuation setting with financial 
statements based on conservative accounting, RIV(IDC) will be: 
        
        )  =     +   ( IDC RIV
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 Leaving  γ unchanged implies the following time series for future expected values of 
  : ) Bv r X ( 1 t t − ⋅ −
 




t 0 − − − − Δ − ⋅ γ   =      
 
                       =    [ ] 1 t t 0
) u (
t , res 0 Cb r ) Cb ( E ) X ( E − ⋅ − Δ ⋅ γ − ⋅ γ  (15) 
 
  The time series hence means that  [ ] 1 t t 0 Cb r ) Cb ( E − ⋅ − Δ  goes towards zero as t → ∞. That 
is, in the long run the conservative bias of residual income is expected to fade away, in 
principle at the same pace as unbiased residual income fades away over time. This is actually 
the only permissible time series specification for this measure of “adjusted” bias growth in 
RIV(IDC), given that (13) holds.
7 
 As  )  in (12) is postulated to be the correct value of owners´ equity, the valuation 
error caused by accounting conservatism in RIV(IDC) is: 
( IDC RIV
UB , 0 V
 
              =    –  ( IDC RIV
0 Dev ) ) ( IDC RIV
CB , 0 V ( ) IDC RIV
UB , 0 V    =     ( ) ( ) [ ]
γ −
Δ − − γ
R
Cb E 1 Cb 1 0 0    (16) 
  
  (16) shows that the valuation error of RIV(IDC)  depends on both the value of Cb0 and the 
growth of the conservative bias in the first period. Since (γ – 1) < 0, the error will be negative 
for all non-negative values of  , and a stronger growth of the conservative bias in 
the first period will make the error more negative. Only if 
( [ 1 0 Cb E Δ ) ]
( ) [ ] ( 1 Cb Cb E 0 1 0 − ) γ < Δ , can the 
valuation error of RIV(IDC) be positive. 
                                                 
7 Given the time series specification of unbiased residual income in (13), the time series dynamics of 
conservatively biased residual income can be written as: 
[ ] 1 t t 0
x ) u (
t , res 0 1 t t 0 t 1 t 0 Cb r ) Cb ( E )) X ( ( E ) Bv r X ( E ) Bv r X ( E − −
•
+ ⋅ − Δ ⋅ γ − Δ ⋅ γ = ⋅ − ⋅ γ = ⋅ −       (15´) 
As   when t → ∞, the factor γ
▪ can only be equal to γ if γ
x = γ, and hence  γ
▪ =  γ.  0 )) X ( ( E
) u (
t , res 0 → Δ
     14  Combining (16) with the time series specification implied by (15) gives the following 
“conservative irrelevance” proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: Given the “clean surplus relation” (G-1), a constant relative growth  ) 1 ( − γ of 
residual income given unbiased accounting (G-5´), RIV(IDC) accommodates 
conservative accounting if (and only if)  ( ) [ ] () [ ] 1 Cb E Cb E 1 t 0 t 0 − γ = Δ − , for t ≥1. 
 
  The information dynamics constrained RIV model is hence unaffected by conservative 
accounting if the growth of the conservative bias in period t coincides with the growth of 
unbiased residual income in the same period. A negative growth of the conservative bias 
equal to  ) 1 ( Cb 1 t − γ −  in the first period implies that future values of  residual income will be 
positively biased, and exactly compensate for the negative bias of the book value of owners´ 
equity at the valuation date.  
 
5.  Conservative Accounting in AEG Valuation Modeling 
 
  Three specifications of AEG valuation modeling will be analysed in this section − the 
unconstrained model AEG
*, a terminal value constrained model, AEG(TVC), and an 
information dynamics constrained model, AEG(IDC). Parallel to the analyses in the previous 
section, the terminal value is set to zero in the terminal value constrained model, and the 
abnormal earnings growth is assumed to be growing at a constant rate in the information 
dynamics constrained model. 
  As in the evaluation of the RIV models, the impact of conservative accounting will be 
assessed in relation to values of owners´ equity in a setting with unbiased accounting. 
Likewise all evaluations presume that no “undoing” of the conservative bias of forecasted 
accounting numbers takes place. 
 
5.1. The unconstrained AEG valuation model 
      Given unbiased accounting, the unconstrained AEG model follows straightforwardly from 
(AEG
*):                 
       =   
* AEG
UB , 0 V




1 0    +   











r / R X Div r X E
  +  
 
         +    
( ) ( )
* T R
r / R X Div P E
u
* T * T * T 0 ⋅ − +
                               (17) 
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With conservative accounting, the unconstrained AEG model also follows directly from 
(AEG
*), and replacing Xt with [ () ( )] t
u
t Cb X Δ −  one obtains: 
      =     
* AEG
CB , 0 V
() () ( )
r
Cb X E 1
u
1 0 Δ −
   +   
         +   












r / R Cb X Div r Cb X E
   +   
         +   




* T * T * T 0
R
r / R Cb X Div P E ⋅ Δ − − +
                              (18) 
  
  The valuation bias due to accounting conservatism is now: 
 
* AEG




CB , 0 V V −
       =   () ( )
r
Cb E 1 0 Δ −








r / R Cb Cb E
  +  




r / R Cb E ⋅ Δ
  =  0                                                         (19)   
 
  As a parallel result to Observation 2 for the RIV* model, we have: 
 
Observation 3: The unconstrained valuation model AEG
* is unaffected by accounting 
conservatism. 
 
  Given the axiomatic derivation of AEG*, Observation 3 is well-known in the accounting 
literature. Subtracting and adding the terms  ( ) ( ) [ ]
1 t
t 0 R / r / Cb E
− Δ  (in addition to 
( ) [ ]
1 t ) u (
t 0 R / ) r / X E
−  ) around future dividends discounted to a present value as in (18), cannot 
affect the value of owners´ equity.
8  
 
5.2. The terminal value constrained AEG valuation model 
In line with Observation 1, the expected terminal value in (AEG
*) is equal to 0 with 
unbiased accounting if T ≥ (T
* + 1). Hence, in order for a terminal value constrained AEG 
model to have no valuation error when the accounting is unbiased, the horizon point in time is 
                                                 
8 Note that the “clean surplus relation” of accounting  (assumption (G-1)) is not required for the unconstrained  
  AEG model to be unaffected by accounting conservatism. 
     16set to T = (T
* + 1).
9 With this value of T, the terminal value constrained models are as 
follows:  
 
        =   
) TVC ( AEG





1 0    +   
( ) ( ) ( ) ∑
= τ
τ





r / R X Div r X E
                        (20) 
     =   
) TVC ( AEG
CB , 0 V ( )
r
X E 1 0    +    ( ) ∑
= τ
τ




r / R X r Div X E
    = 
  =   
() () ( )
r
Cb X E 1
u
1 0 Δ −
    +   
       +  











r / R Cb X Div r Cb X E
        (21) 
 
  The difference between   and  ( TVC AEG
CB , 0 V ) ( ) TVC AEG
UB , 0 V  is then: 
     =    ( TVC AEG
0 Dev ) () ()
r
Cb E 1 0 Δ −









r / R Cb Cb E
        (22) 
  





    )  =    ( TVC AEG
0 Dev () ( ) []
* T
* T 1 * T 0
R




r / R Cb E ⋅ Δ
    =  
           =   −  () []
* T
1 * T 0
R
r / Cb E + Δ
                     ( 2 2 ´ )  
 
The valuation error of the terminal value constrained AEG model is thus equal to the 
negative present value of the capitalized bias growth in period (T
*+ 2). This gives us the 
following “conservative irrelevance” proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: Given only 0-NPV activities after τ = T
* (G-5), AEG(TVC) with T = (T* + 1) 
accommodates conservative accounting if (and only if)  .  () [] 0 Cb E 1 * T 0 = Δ +
 
                                                 
9 Given knowledge about the characteristics of  AEG
* as expressed in Observation 1 (section 2),  
  setting T = (T
* + 1) in AEG(TVC) would be a natural choice. 
     17  Knowing that the “missing” terminal value in  is 
TVC , AEG
CB , 0 V
() ( ) [ ]
1 * T +
1 * T
) u (
1 * T 1 * T 1 * T 0 R / r / R Cb X Div P E + + + + ⋅ Δ − − + ,  and that the “clean surplus relation” 
implies that this can be rewritten as  ( ) ( ) [ ]
1 * T








* T 0 X B E − ,
10 it is easy to 
see that the terminal value drops out if  ( ) 1 * T Cb + Δ  = 0. Notably this also means that 
and   coincide when 
TVC , AEG
CB , 0 V
* AEG
CB , 0 V ( ) 1 * T Cb + Δ  = 0. 
 
5.3. The information dynamics constrained AEG valuation model 
      In line with Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005) and given unbiased accounting, the 
information dynamics constrained AEG valuation model – denoted AEG(IDC) – is specified 
as: 
   
      =   
) IDC ( AEG





1 0    +  
( ) ( ) [ ]
´ R






⋅ − ⋅ +
                  (23) 
 
       where:  γ´  =  1 + relative change of expected unbiased abnormal earnings  
                             growth in periods t = 1, 2, …,T;  ∞ → T  
 
 Given  unbiased accounting and knowing that the company will pursue only 0-NPV 
projects in the long run, assumption (G-5) is now replaced with (G-5´´): 
 
(G-5´´)  The parameter  ' γ  incorporates that the company over time increasingly will engage in  
              0-NPV projects, and in the long run only pursue 0-NPV activities; hence 0 , 1 ´ 0 < γ ≤ . 
 Provided that the “clean surplus relation” holds, we know from (2) that: 




() () [ ] R X Div r X E
u
1 t 1 t
u
2 t 0 ⋅ − ⋅ + + + +    =   ( )
) u (
1 t , res
) u (
2 t , res 0 X X E + + −          ( 2 4 )  
   In the analysis of the information dynamics constrained RIV model it was assumed that 
() ( ) ( )
) u (
t , res 0
u
1 t , res X E X E ⋅ γ = +  , in turn implying:  0
 
    () () ( ) R X Div r X E
u
1 t 1 t
u




1 t 0 ⋅ − ⋅ + +   =   








1 t , res 0 X X E − +   =   
                                                 
10 Cf. AEG
* and expression (3) in section 2. 




1 t 0 ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ − γ +                  (25) 
 
  (25) means that values of abnormal earnings growth in AEG(IDC) change at the rate  
(γ – 1) over time, i.e. the same rate as for residual income in the information dynamics 
constrained RIV model. Formally we have: 
 
Observation 4: Given the “clean surplus relation” of accounting (G-1), an unbiased 
accounting regime and 0-NPV activities as specified in (G-5´), the relative 








t 0 Bv r X E − ⋅ −  are the same; 
i.e.  γ´ = γ. 
 
  Presuming that investors use γ in AEG(IDC) also when the accounting is conservative, the 
value of owners´ equity becomes: 
 
    =   
) IDC ( AEG
CB , 0 V ( )
r
X E 1 0    +    [ ]
γ −
⋅ − ⋅ +
R
r / R X Div r X E 1 1 2 0    = 
                   =    
() () [ ]
r
Cb X E 1
u
1 0 Δ −
   +    
           +   
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
γ −
⋅ Δ − − ⋅ + Δ −
R




2 0      (26) 
 
 Leaving  γ unchanged in a setting with conservative accounting now means that: 
 
      ( ) ( )= − ⋅ γ = − + + + t , res 1 t , res 0 1 t , res 2 t , res 0 X X E X X E  








1 t 0 Bv r X Bv r X E − + ⋅ − − ⋅ − ⋅ γ =  
                                               ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [] 1 1 t 0 Cb r Cb Cb r Cb E − τ τ τ + ⋅ − Δ − ⋅ − Δ ⋅ γ −          (27) 
 
 As  00 , 1 0 < γ ≤
() 1 t Cb r Cb +
, the expected change in the “adjusted" conservative bias growth 
() ( ) ( [ 1 t t t 0 Cb r Cb E − ⋅ − Δ ) ] − ⋅ − Δ  goes towards zero in the long run. Given that 
expression (25) holds, this is actually the only permissible time series specification for this 
measure of “adjusted” bias growth in AEG(IDC). 
  The valuation error due to accounting conservatism in AEG(IDC) is now: 
  
     19       () =
IDC AEG
0 Dev () ( ) IDC AEG
UB , 0
IDC AEG
CB , 0 V V −   = 
           =    () []
r
Cb E 1 0 Δ −
   –   ( ) ( ) [ ]
γ −
⋅ Δ − Δ
R
r / R Cb Cb E 1 2 0     = 
           =   () [] ( ) [ ]
() γ −
Δ − γ ⋅ Δ
R r
Cb E Cb E 2 0 1 0                  (28) 
  Expression (28) shows that the error caused by conservative accounting in the information 
dynamics constrained AEG model depends on the expected growth of the conservative bias in 
the first and the second period. A necessary condition for   is now that  0 Dev
) IDC ( AEG
0 =
() [] = Δ 2 0 Cb E () [] γ ⋅ Δ 1 0 Cb E , since the numerator on the RHS of (28) then becomes zero. 
Combining this result with the required time series for the “adjusted” conservative bias 
growth implied by (27), the following “conservative irrelevance” proposition is obtained: 
  
Proposition 4: Given the “clean surplus relation” (G-1) and a constant relative periodic 
change ( ) 1 − γ  of abnormal earnings growth given unbiased accounting  
                        (G-5´´), AEG(IDC) accommodates conservative accounting if (and only if)  
                         () [] () [] γ ⋅ Δ = Δ + t 0 1 t 0 Cb E Cb E,   t  ≥ 1. 
 
  Proposition 4 allows for some benchmark observations. First, if there is no growth in the 
conservative bias in future periods (ie. ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] 0 Cb E Cb E t 0 1 t 0 = Δ = Δ + ), the valuation error of 
AEG(IDC) is zero. Second, if both  ( ) [ ] 1 0 Cb E Δ  and  ( ) [ ] 2 0 Cb E Δ  are positive but  
() [] 1 t 0 Cb E + Δ  <  , AEG(IDC) can be unbiased. This would be possible if the 
negative bias of E0(X1)/r  is fully “counter-balanced” by the positive bias of 
( [ t 0 Cb E Δ ) ]
[ ] ( γ − R ) ⋅ − r / R X1 1 ⋅ + Div r X E 2 0  in (26) above. The result indicates that the AEG(IDC) 
model can be more robust to accounting conservatism than RIV(AEG), as the latter model 
cannot accommodate a positive future growth of the conservative bias (cf. Proposition 2, 
subsection 4.3). 
 
6.  AEG versus RIV Models when the Accounting is Conservative 
      Propositions 1 to 4 above provide conditions for constrained RIV and AEG valuation 
modeling to be unaffected by conservative accounting. A complementing question is now 
whether it would be possible to assess whether RIV or AEG modeling is more or less 
     20distorted by accounting conservatism. Or, stated somewhat differently, given that an 
accounting regime is conservatively biased – which type of modeling is associated with the 
smallest valuation errors? 
  Regarding the unconstrained models RIV
* and AEG
*, a first result is obvious. As both 
models are unaffected by accounting conservatism, no ranking of these models is possible. On 
the other hand, all constrained RIV and AEG models are potentially affected by valuation 
errors due to conservative accounting, as indicated by Propositions 1 to 4. In order to settle 
which type of modeling that is associated with the smallest errors, comparisons between these 
models are carried out in the following two sub-sections.  
 
6.1. AEG versus RIV – the terminal value constrained models 
The valuation error associated with the terminal value constrained RIV model is    
according to (11) above. Given conservatively biased accounting, this error 
is non-positive. As the sign of the valuation error of the terminal value constrained AEG 
model – Dev0
AEG(TVC) in (22´) above – is indeterminate, the following two conditions have to 




T 0 R / ) Cb ( E
)
 
     =    ( TVC AEG
0 Dev () []
* T











−      (29.a) 
 
          and 
 
      =    ( TVC AEG
0 Dev ) () []
* T











          (29.b) 
 
  Solving (29.a) and (29.b) gives the following (necessary and sufficient) conditions for the 
AEG model to be more accurate than the corresponding RIV model:                     
      
                                         (29.a´)  () [ 0 Cb r Cb E 1 * T * T 0 > Δ − ⋅ + ]
]
      and                                                  
                                          (29. b´)  () [ 0 Cb r Cb E 1 * T * T 0 > Δ + ⋅ +
 
  The valuation error associated  with AEG(TVC) is hence smaller than the valuation error 
for RIV(TVC) if the expected growth of the conservative bias in period  (T
*+ 1) is larger than 
, but smaller than  () r Cb E * T 0 ⋅ − () r Cb E * T 0 ⋅ . The following proposition follows: 
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Proposition 5: Given the “clean surplus relation” (G-1), only 0-NPV activities after  
τ = T
* (G-5), the error for AEG(TVC) is smaller than the error for RIV(TVC) if 
(and only if)  () r Cb E * T 0 ⋅ −  <  ( ) [ ] 1 * T 0 Cb E + Δ  <  ( ) r Cb E * T 0 ⋅ . Conversely, if 
 <  () [] 1 * T 0 Cb E + Δ ( ) r Cb E * T 0 ⋅ −  or   ( ) [ ] 1 + * T 0 Cb E Δ  >  ( ) r * ⋅ Cb E T 0 , RIV(TVC) 
is superior to AEG(TVC). 
 
  The terminal value constrained AEG model works better in situations with more modest 
changes of the accounting bias in period T
*+ 1. As T
*+ 1 is the first period in the company 
steady state, one might expect that  ( ) [ ] 1 * T 0 Cb E + Δ  =  ( ) ss * T 0 g Cb E ⋅ , with  being a constant 
growth rate. Given that  , AEG(TVC) would then be affected by smaller valuation 




g r ss < < −
− <  (not an unrealistic assumption for more mature 
companies, or companies extracting natural resources with limited economic lives), the 
terminal value constrained RIV model will be more accurate than the corresponding AEG 
model. 
 
6.2. AEG valuation versus RIV – the information dynamics constrained models 
  A comparison between the information dynamics constrained RIV and AEG models have 
to be consistent with Proposition 2 (subsection 4.3) and Proposition 4 (subsection 5.3). This 
turns out to be more complex than to just make a comparison between   and 
,  as these errors are conditioned on model-specific time series of  the “adjusted” 
conservative bias growth, or changes in the “adjusted” conservative bias growth. That is, 
 is conditioned on  
) IDC ( RIV
0 Dev
) IDC ( AEG
0 Dev
) IDC ( RIV
0 Dev
    () [] ( ) [] 1 t t 0 t 1 t 0 Cb r Cb E Cb r Cb E − + ⋅ − Δ ⋅ γ = ⋅ − Δ  ,           (30) 
 
      while   is conditioned on 
) IDC ( AEG
0 Dev
 
    () () ( ) () [] t 1 t t 2 t 0 Cb r Cb Cb r Cb E ⋅ − Δ − ⋅ − Δ + +  =  
     () () ( ) ( [] 1 t t t 1 t 0 Cb r Cb Cb r Cb E − + ) ⋅ − Δ − ⋅ − Δ ⋅ γ = .                 (31) 
 
As shown in Ohlson (2005), the time series specification of the “adjusted” conservative 
bias growth in (30) is consistent with the time series dynamics of the change in this 
conservative bias growth in (31), but the converse does not hold. Hence we have: 
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Proposition 6: Given that RIV(IDC) accommodates conservative accounting, AEG(IDC) also 
accommodates conservative accounting. The converse is not true. 
 
  Proposition 6 means that both RIV(IDC) and AEG(IDC) accommodate accounting 
conservatism if, for example,   () [] ( ) [ ] 1 Cb E Cb E 1 t 0 1 t 0 − γ ⋅ ⋅ γ = Δ − +  < 
() [] = − γ ⋅ < − 1 Cb E 1 t 0 ( [ 0 Cb E Δ ) ] t , ie. a decreasing conservative bias over time where the 
decrease in period t + 1 is smaller than the decrease in period t. However, if there is an 
increasing conservative bias in the sense that  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] γ ⋅ Δ = Δ + 0 1 t 0 E Cb E
() ] 0 Cb = τ
t Cb , only the AEG 
model is able to provide the correct value of owners´ equity. Another example would be a “no 
growth” scenario, i.e.   for t ≥ 1. Referring back to Proposition 2 and 
Proposition 4, it is easily recognized that only AEG(IDC) can accommodate a scenario of this 
kind. 
[ E0 Δ
A particularly interesting case is a steady state scenario, with only 0-NPV activities and a 
constant relative growth of the conservative bias over time. Accounting numbers are in 
general postulated to grow at the same pace (= ) in a scenario of this kind, and hence 
 = 
ss g
() [] 1 t 0 Cb E + Δ () [] ( )( ) [ ] ss 0 ss ss t 0 g 1 E g g 1 Cb E t Cb + Δ = ⋅ + . Setting gss = γ – 1, it is easily seen 
that both Proposition 2 and Proposition 4 would be fulfilled, and hence that both RIV(IDC) 




t 0 = ⋅ − −  in this 
scenario, the time series for  ( ) 1 t t 0 Bv r X E − ⋅ −  is then solely governed by the time series 
specification for  ( ) [ 1 t t 0 Cb r Cb E − ⋅ − Δ
() () [] 1 t t t Bv r X − ⋅ − −
() () ( ) () [ 1 t t t 1 Cb r Cb Cb r −
]  in the RIV model. Likewise, the time series for 
 would solely be governed by the time series specification 
for 
1 t 0 r X E + ⋅ −
t 0 Cb E
Bv
+ ] ⋅ − Δ − ⋅ − Δ  in the AEG model. This implies that gss in a 
steady state does not have to be equal to (γ – 1),
11 and as long as  () R g 1 00 , 1 ss < + ≤ −  both 
RIV(IDC) and AEG(IDC) will work. 
Proposition 6 might give the impression that AEG(IDC) dominates RIV(IDC) regarding 
the ability to accommodate accounting conservatism.
12 However, this impression is somewhat 
deceptive. AEG(IDC) allows for positive future growth in ( ), Cb E t 0  but as stated in 
Proposition 4 only as long as   () [] ( ) [ ] γ ⋅ Δ = Δ + t 0 1 t 0 Cb E Cb E . Since 0 ≤ γ < 1,0 this means that  
                                                 
11 Cf. subsection 4.3, footnote 7 in particular. 
12 Cf. also the analysis in Ohlson & Gao (2006), pp. 54-56, proposing that AEG(IDC) in general is more versatile 
than RIV(IDC).  
     23() [] 0 Cb E 1 t 0 → Δ +  as t → ∞, ie. in the long run the conservative bias  [ ] K Cb E t 0 → , K being 
some non-negative constant. The virtue of this time series for  [ ] t 0 Cb E  is rather moot. First, it 
is by no means clear that the growth of  ( ) [ ] 1 t 0 Cb E + Δ  should be governed by the parameter γ 
(specifying the time series of unbiased residual income). Second, a constant conservative bias 
 means that    when t → ∞ if the long run growth of owners´ 
equity is positive, and  
[] t 0 Cb E () Bv E / Cb E t 0 t 0
()
() 0 →
() ∞ → t
k →
0 t 0 Bv E / Cb E
()() Bv E / Cb t 0 t 0
 if this growth is negative. As one rather 
would expect that E , 0 < k < ∞, in the long run (cf. Runsten, 1998, ch. 
5, and Skogsvik, 1998) neither alternative appears to be realistic. Only in a steady state setting 
with gss = 0 would it be possible for  ( ) ( ) k t → Bv E / Cb 0 t E0
()
 as t → ∞ with the required time-
series dynamics for  [ ] 1 t 0 Cb E + Δ ; ie. the advantage of AEG(IDC) would  then be constrained 
to zero-growth steady states. 
   
8. Concluding  remarks 
 
In the quest for more useful equity valuation models, both residual income and abnormal 
earnings growth modeling stand out as worthwhile contributions. As neither RIV nor AEG 
valuation has much to say about any required accounting principles, one might expect that 
“anything goes” in both types of modeling. However, this only holds for the unconstrained 
model specifications. In terminal value and information dynamics constrained models, the 
magnitude and/or variations of the accounting conservative bias typically create valuation 
errors. 
  Conservative accounting causes the book value of owners´ equity to be negatively biased, 
and accounting earnings to be negatively or positively biased. In RIV modeling this means 
that the “valuation anchor” – the book value of owners´ equity – will be negatively biased, but 
that future residual income can be either negatively or positively biased. The bias of the 
“valuation anchor” in AEG modeling – capitalized next period earnings – depends on the 
growth of the conservative bias in the first period. If this is positive, the “valuation anchor” 
will be negatively biased, and vice versa. However, the bias of earnings in the first period has 
an opposite effect on the abnormal earnings growth for the following period.  
  It has been shown that both terminal value and information dynamics constrained RIV and 
AEG models allow for conservative accounting under certain conditions. In principle, all of 
these conditions are in line with the notion of the “cancelling error theorem” (Ohlson, 2005), 
in the sense that biases in future residual income compensate for the negative bias of owners’ 
     24equity at t = 0 in RIV modeling, while biases in future earnings cancel out in the summation 
of capitalized earnings and capitalized abnormal earnings growth in AEG modeling. 
In order to further analyse the “conservative irrelevance” propositions put forth in the 
paper, differences between the valuation errors of comparable models have been evaluated. 
Regarding the constrained model specifications, it has been found that: 
     ● The terminal value constrained AEG valuation model is superior to the corresponding  
         RIV model if the expected conservative bias at the horizon point in time is positive and 
         the growth of the conservative bias is in the interval ] [ r ) Cb ( E , r ) Cb ( E
T 0 T 0 ⋅ ⋅ − ∗ ∗  in 
         period (T
*+1)  (Proposition 5, subsection 6.1). 
      ● Provided that the information dynamics constrained RIV model accommodates  
         conservative accounting, the information dynamics constrained AEG model will also 
         allow for conservative accounting, but the opposite does not hold (Proposition 6, 
         subsection 6.2).  
 
The first result is closely related to “Proposition II” in Ohlson (2005).
13 However, 
Ohlson´s proposition is based on a more stylized setting, where a company goes towards a 
steady-state setting with   and  r g 0 ss < < ( ) [ ] [ ] ss t 0 1 t 0 g Cb E Cb E ⋅ = Δ + . This means that 
() [] [ ] r Cbt ⋅ E Cb E 0 0 1 t 0 < Δ ≤ + ,  in turn implying that Ohlson´s proposition is a special case of 
Proposition 5 in this paper. The second result is in line with “Proposition III” in Ohlson 
(2005).
14 
Compared to previous research – in particular Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005), Ohlson 
(2005) and Ohlson & Gao (2006) – the paper provides a sharper assessment of the sensitivity 
to accounting conservatism in RIV and AEG modeling. It has for example been shown that: 
• AEG(TVC) is affected by smaller valuation errors than RIV(TVC) as long as the 
    growth of the conservative bias in period T* + 1 is not too extreme. Given a steady state  
    setting with non-negative growth in period T*+1, AEG(TVC) dominates  
    RIV(TVC). However, if there is negative growth less than  r ) Cb ( E
T 0 ⋅ − ∗ , RIV(TVC)  
    will be affected by smaller valuation errors than AEG(TVC). 
• Given a plausible time-series dynamics of residual income given unbiased accounting, 
    RIV(IDC) allows for conservative accounting if  ( ) 0 Cb E0 → τ  as  ∞ → τ , while  
    AEG(IDC) allows for conservative accounting if  ( ) 0 K Cb E0 ≥ → τ , as  . Hence  ∞ → τ
                                                 
13 Cf. p. 336, Ohlson (2005). 
14 Cf. p. 339, Ohlson (2005).  
     25   RIV(IDC) can be more valid for companies characterized by negative growth in the long  
   run, while AEG(IDC) can be more valid for companies characterized by zero growth in 
   the long run. Also, RIV(IDC) and AEG(IDC) work equally well in a company steady 
   state where γ is replaced by   in the models.  () ss g 1+
)
 
      The choice of a particular valuation model in empirical research is often driven by a desire 
for both modeling validity and parsimony. The constrained RIV and AEG models are 
supposed to be helpful in accounting-based valuation with limited access to forecasts of 
accounting numbers. In this regard, RIV(IDC) only requires the assessment of Bv0  and the 
prediction of  , while AEG(IDC) requires predictions of  ( 1 0 X E ( )(1 0 1 0 Div E , X E )
)
 and 
. The AEG model hence requires additional forecasts –  ( 2 0 X E ( ) 1 0 Div E at the end of the first 
period and  for the second period – as compared to the RIV model. One might argue 
that this creates an “unfair” advantage for the AEG model, and that AEG(IDC)  rather should 
be compared with the following specification of RIV(IDC): 
() 2 0 X E
 
   () ( )








Bv r X E
r 1
Bv r X E
Bv V
1 2 0 0 1 0
0
) IDC ( RIV
CB , 0                          (32) 
 
 Analyzing   in the same manner as  in subsection 4.3, one finds that 
RIV(IDC)´  accommodates conservative accounting if 
) IDC ( RIV
CB , 0 V
′ ) IDC ( RIV
CB , 0 V
( ) [ ] () [ ] 1 Cb E Cb 1 t 0 t − E γ = Δ −
) IDC ( RIV
UB , 0 V
2 t for ≥  
(instead of   for  ). The new model specification permits any value of 
, meaning that the applicability of this information dynamics constrained RIV 
model has improved. In a setting where T* = 1 (and consequently γ  being replaced by 
 on the RHS of (32)),  would actually be equal to  ; ie. without error. 
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Appendix: Proof that  = 0  
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